declares "I'm not", only to be immediately shushed by those nearby. With incisive wit, the Pythons here highlight the complexities and paradoxes that emerge whenever one tries to untangle the circular interrelationship between individuals and groups, especially within the context of religion. Among those complexities, as Jörg R(üpke) demonstrates in this engaging volume, is the constant possibility that individuality can be seen as deviance.
This book is one of the many fruits of the Kollegforschergruppe "Religiöse Individualisierung in historischer Perspektive", established in 2008 at the Max Weber Center of the University of Erfurt. According to the author's "Avant-Propos" (2), it originated in a series of four lectures delivered over the course of a month spent at the Collège de France (during February -March 2010, although the date is not noted here). As often with R.s publications, it exists in different versions in different languages. The first to be published was in German: "Aberglauben oder Individualität? Religiöse Abweichung im römischen Reich" (Tübingen 2011), of which the volume under review is a French version (translated by Ludivine Beaurin). More recently, an English version (translated by David M. B. Richardson) has been published by Cambridge University Press as "Religious Deviance in the Roman World. Superstition or Individuality?" (Cambridge 2016). I use the term ‚version' rather than ‚translation' deliberately, for no one of the three is exactly like the others. Both the French and English versions contain all the chapters of the German edition, but each also includes an additional chapter not found in the original: the French an initial chapter entitled "Individualité religieuse dans l'Antiquité" and the English a chapter entitled "The Role of Ethos and Knowledge in Controlling Religious Deviance: A Tiberian View of Priestly Deviance", inserted between what in the French version appear as chapters 3 and 4. The fact that the book allows for these variations is an indication of its general nature.
R.s core strategy is to use the concepts of religious individuality and religious deviance to illuminate one another. As so often in R.s work, this is a brilliant idea: so simple that it seems obvious, yet at the same time novel and productive of valuable insights. For what is deviance, after all, but the violation of norms? Norms, in turn, are the standards and conventions that are established and enforced, either formally or informally, by the members of a group acting collectively. An individual who acts on the basis of his or her own particular desires, preferences, and conceptions may thus act in ways that violate group norms. Consequently, individuality and deviance can in some instances be the same thing seen from different perspectives, and it is for this reason that the examination of the one may shed light on the other.
Readers expecting a tautly argued and linear development of this insight are likely to be disappointed, however, since the book consists instead of a series of loosely interrelated meditations and case studies. This is very much what the variability of its content in the different versions would lead one to expect. The opening chapter, which as noted above appears only in the French version, provides some introductory reflections on the applicability of the concept of individuality to the study of classical antiquity, followed by a survey of some ancient religious practices that allowed scope for individual choice (combination of deities in dedications, the intensification of ritual, individual revelations, and deification) as well as contexts in which individuals could exercise that choice (temples, the ‚care of the self', religious groups). The second chapter addresses the second of the book's core analytical categories, religious deviance, with some brief remarks on earlier scholarship on this topic.
There follow three chapters that focus on different sets of texts. Chapter 3, "La production des normes religieuses dans la République tardive", after some brief remarks on religious prescriptions found in the fragments of early Roman jurists, centers on an examination of two key texts from the mid-first century BCE: Varro's Antiquitates rerum divinarum (or rather the scanty citations that have come down to us) and Book 2 of Cicero's De legibus. Both writers, R. argues, reconceptualized religion as a form of knowledge that was guarded and elaborated by public priests. In this connection I might note that the recent book of D. MacRae, "Legible Religion. Books, Gods, and Rituals in Roman Culture" (Harvard 2016), provides a valuable complement to R.s volume, by analyzing in detail the role of these and similar writers in the transformation of Roman religion. R. begins his fourth chapter, "De superstitione: Expériences religieuses interdites dans les temples", with an examination of two key texts of the imperial period, Plutarch's Peri deisidaimonias and the fragments of Seneca's De superstitione. Picking up on Seneca's scornful dismissal of the people (ordinary people, that is, not priests) who tend to the statues of the gods as though they were living beings, R. devotes the bulk of the chapter to a discussion of the use of divine images in religious practice. Chapter 5, "Le discours normatif de l'Antiquité tardive", opens with a brief discussion of Tertullian's Apologeticum but focuses for the most part on legal texts, especially imperial decrees from the Codex Theodosianus. R. surveys the various aspects of religion that became subject to imperial regulation: priesthoods and religious offices, sacred property, ritual practices, and ultimately "savoir", by which he means such things as doctrine on the Trinity.
In the sixth chapter R. returns to a thematic discussion, in this instance of "l'individualisation religieuse dans le monde gréco-romain", and reflects on various aspects of individual experience and choice. The seventh and final chapter, "Déviance et individuation: de Cicéron au Code Théodosien", is not so much a summing up as a sketch for an analytical framework within which to assess change over time. Cicero's choice of law as a category for reconceptualizing religion as a form of knowledge allowed for the transformation of elite stand-ards about appropriate and inappropriate behavior, as found in the treatises of Seneca and Plutarch, into something enforceable in practice: "La dignité pénale de la déviance religieuse ainsi décrite devient concevable" (104). This potential is actualized only gradually and inconsistently, however, and much policing of elite standards was left to unofficial discourses such as philosophy and satire. Yet it was the very reconceptualization of religion as a form of knowledge that ultimately proved to be of more consequence, since "avec la normalisation des savoirs religieux, comme elle est effectuée à la fin du IVe siècle, les systèmes de connaissance alternatifs deviennent problématiques" (110). As a result, "dans ces conditions de normalisations religieuses qui s'étendent, l'individualité religieuse devient facilement déviance" (111).
As will be clear from this brief overview of its contents, this book covers a very wide range of material in relatively few pages. It is thus not surprising that it is impressionistic rather than comprehensive, suggestive rather than probative. Even so, I was somewhat disappointed that R. does not more frequently bring the ideas of individuality and deviance into direct dialogue with each other. He seems instead to treat his two topics in alternation, so that he implies rather than explicitly explores their interrelationship. In the end, however, the book's strength does not lie in the development of a rigorous analysis, but rather in the number of ideas that it generates and the possibilities for further research that it opens up. For that we have reason to be grateful.
